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NOTE
Serious Personal Injury Requirement for Rape Is Met by Mental Injury
Alone-State v. Baker
INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina General Assembly amended the state's rape
laws in 1979. In redefining first degree rape, the legislature replaced
the previous language, "serious bodily injury" with the words "serious
personal injury."' With this change, the legislature broadened the in-
terpretation of the "serious personal injury" element of first degree
rape such that mental injury as well as physical bodily injury could
satisfy this element. This note will discuss, through case law examples,
types of mental injuries which have been held sufficient to constitute
serious personal injury to a rape victim. The note will review the dif-
ference between first degree and second degree rape in North Caro-
lina. Finally, the note will consider the possible implications for future
first degree rape prosecutions, focusing on the serious personal injury
element. The stimulus for this note is the North Carolina Supreme
Court decision in State v. Baker,2 which upheld a first degree rape
conviction based on mental injuries to the victim deemed sufficient to
satisfy the serious personal injury element of first degree rape under
North Carolina law.
PRIOR NORTH CAROLINA LAW
The critical issue in Baker was the interpretation of the definition of
"serious personal injury" to distinguish first degree rape from second
degree rape. North Carolina General Statute Section 14-27.2 (a) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the person engages
in vaginal intercourse:
(2) With another person by force and against the will of the other
person, and:
1. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 682.
2. 336 N.C. 58, 441 S.E.2d 551 (1994).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(2)b. (1993).
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a. Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an
article which the other person reasonably believes to be a
dangerous or deadly weapon; or
b. Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another
person; or
c. The person commits the offense aided and abetted by one
or more other persons.4
By contrast, Section 14-27.3 defines second degree rape as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person en-
gages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
(1) By force and against the will of the other person; ....5
The distinguishing feature between the two degrees of rape is the
existence of one or more of the elements enumerated in subdivisions
a. through c.. of Section 14-27.2(a)(2).
In 1979, the statute was amended to include the requirement that
the victim suffer "serious personal injury." Before that time, the
wording provided that the defendant must cause "serious bodily in-
jury." Three years after the legislature amended the statute, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Boone held that the "inflic-
tion of 'serious personal injury' as required by G.S. 14-27.2(2)b....
may be met by the showing of mental injury as well as bodily injury. '
The Boone decision was a highly significant change from pre-amend-
ment law, which had required serious bodily injury. The leading case
defining serious bodily injury had previously been State v. Jones7,
which stated:
The term "inflicts serious injury" means physical or bodily injury re-
sulting from an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. The
injury must be serious but it must fall short of causing death. Further
definition seems neither wise nor desirable. Whether such serious in-
jury has been inflicted must be determined according to the particular
facts of each case.8
All of the cases cited in the Boone opinion involved tangible bodily
injuries, and the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to attempt
to define the substance of the phrase "serious bodily injury." Instead
it followed the rule from Jones that the particular facts of each case
would determine whether serious injury had occurred.9
Following the same line of reasoning as that used in Jones, the
Boone court did not attempt to enunciate a "bright line" rule as to
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (1993).
6. 307 N.C. 198, 204, 297 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1982).
7. 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1, (1962)). In Jones, the injury sustained by the victim was a
shotgun wound to the back of the head.
8. Id. at 91, 128 S.E.2d at 3.
9. Boone, 307 N.C. at 204, 297 S.E.2d at 589.
19951
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when serious personal injury had been inflicted. Instead, the Boone
court held that the existence of mental injury sufficient to constitute
serious personal injury within the meaning of the statute must be de-
termined from the particular facts of each case. The Boone court rea-
soned that because the legislature had created two degrees of rape,
the lawmakers must have intended for the mental injury inflicted dur-
ing rape to be more than the res gestae results10 present in every forci-
ble rape." Further, the court held that "the State must ordinarily
offer proof that such injury was not only caused by the defendant but
that the injury extended for some appreciable time beyond the inci-
dents surrounding the crime itself."' 2 In Boone, the victim's hysteria
and crying immediately after the rape were not found to be evidence
of mental injury sufficient to satisfy the requirement for first degree
rape. The record disclosed no residual injury to the mind or nervous
system of the victim.'
3
In 1990, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld two first de-
gree rape convictions against defendants' challenges that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the victims suffered seri-
ous mental personal injuries. In State v. Mayes,14 the victim dropped
out of community college, moved from the city where she had been
living, and obtained professional counseling from a mental health
center and a shelter for abused women. At the time of the trial seven
months later, the victim was still suffering from her mental injury.
Later the same year, in State v. Davis,'5 the court of appeals held that
the victim's continued appetite loss, severe headaches, nightmares,
sleep difficulty, and difficulty in urination and bowel movements fol-
lowing rape and sodomy were sufficient to support a first degree rape
conviction based on serious personal injury. It is important to note in
both of these cases that the defendant displayed a dangerous weapon
or an article believed to be a dangerous weapon. Thus, the fulfillment
of the dangerous weapon element could have provided an alternate or
additional basis for a first degree rape conviction under the statute.
STATEMENT OF TiE CASE
In State v. Baker, the State's evidence showed that on the night of
the rape, the victim was asleep in the mobile home where she resided
10. Res gestae results are those "so closely connected to occurrence or event in both time
and substance as to be part of the happening." BLACK's LAW DICrnONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
11. 307 N.C. at 205, 297 S.E.2d at 590.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. 97 N.C. App. 559, 389 S.E.2d 585, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 803, 393 S.E.2d 903 (1990).
15. 101 N.C. App. 12, 398 S.E.2d 645 (1990), appeal dismissed & disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C.
574, 403 S.E.2d 516 (1991).
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with her infant son, her roommate, and the roommate's two young
children. After hearing the defendant knock, she went to the door
and began to open it because she recognized the defendant as her
roommate's boy friend. The defendant burst into the home and raped
the victim. The State offered testimony which demonstrated that the
victim suffered from loss of appetite and depression. She quit her job
because she was unable to handle public interactions. She moved out
of her home and contacted a rape crisis center for counseling. She
had nightmares or was unable to sleep. Most significantly, she was
unable to care for her infant son for a period of nine months. At the
time of trial, which was almost a year after the rape, testimony
demonstrated that the victim was still having problems with her
nerves and trouble sleeping, 6 and experienced weight loss and
headaches.' 7
The defendant was convicted of both first degree rape and second
degree sexual offense; he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
first degree rape. The court of appeals overturned the first degree
rape conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence of serious per-
sonal injury.' 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, based
on the evidence that the victim was still suffering from "bad nerves" at
the time of the trial in addition to other post-rape symptoms.19 The
court found that these symptoms met the Boone test, and that a rea-
sonable juror could have concluded that these injuries were not res
gestae results present in every forcible rape.2' The court held that the
victim's mental injuries were sufficient to meet the statutory require-
ment of serious personal injury, and reinstated the first degree rape
conviction.2'
ANALYSIS
The decision in the Baker case marks the first time that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has upheld a first degree rape conviction
based solely on a serious personal injury that was entirely of a mental
and emotional type. While this decision is not unsupported by princi-
ples laid out in previous North Carolina case law, it does show a sub-
stantial broadening of the use of the serious personal injury element
as a basis for conviction of first degree rape. Indeed, the court's rejec-
tion of the defendant's argument concerning the requirement for the
16. 336 N.C. at 61, 441 S.E.2d at 552-53.
17. State v. Baker, 109 N.C. App. 557, 562, 428 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1993), rev'd, 336 N.C. 58,
441 S.E.2d 551 (1994).
18. 109 N.C. App. at 563, 428 S.E.2d at 219.
19. 336 N.C. at 61, 441 S.E.2d at 553.
20. Id. at 65, 441 S.E.2d at 555.
21. Id. at 65-66, 441 S.E.2d at 555.
1995]
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presence of some other act not found within the res gestae of a forci-
ble rape clearly establishes the court's position in support of mental
22injury. The court stated that the interpretation of the law urged by
the defendant would discount even serious, lingering, diagnosable
mental injuries unless the injury stemmed from an act not present in
every forcible rape.23 By its holding, the court has recognized that
mental injuries that remain for an appreciable time after the rape are
serious injuries.
North Carolina is not alone in recognizing that serious personal in-
jury need not be solely of a physical character. Seven states have sex
offense statutes that consider the victim's mental or emotional state to
be an aggravating factor which can elevate the severity of the of-
fense.2 4 Michigan's statute defines "personal injury" as "bodily injury,
disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or
loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ. ' 2  The statute
does not define "mental anguish." New Mexico's statute, by contrast,
defines "great mental anguish" as "psychological or emotional dam-
age that requires psychiatric or psychological treatment or care, either
on an in-patient or out-patient basis, and is characterized by extreme
behavioral change or severe physical symptoms."2 6 Personal injury is
also defined in the same statute as "bodily injury to a lesser degree
than great bodily harm and includes, but is not limited to, disfigure-
ment, mental anguish, chronic or recurrent pain, pregnancy or disease
or injury to a sexual or reproductive organ."" It is significant, how-
ever, that in all of these jurisdictions, there is clear statutory language
to the effect that mental anguish is an adequate and bona fide injury
sufficient to elevate the degree of the crime. North Carolina's statute
22. The court explained that the defendant's argument that some other act not present in
every forcible rape was required to inflict serious personal mental injury stemmed from his mis-
understanding of State v. Coefield, 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989). In that case, the defend-
ant choked the victim until she lost consciousness immediately following the rape. The victim
there continued to suffer mental injury consisting of nightmares almost four years later. The
mental injury in that case was used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for a conviction of
second degree rape. There was no discussion in the case as to whether the strangling and resul-
tant nightmares constituted serious personal injury so as to raise the crime to first degree rape.
Baker 336 N.C. at 63, 441 S.E.2d at 554.
23. The court further explained that a requirement such as that argued by the defendant
was not supported by the plain meaning of the statute, which it held to be clear and unambigu-
ous, leaving no room for judicial construction. Id.
24. These include Delaware, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 775 (Supp. 1992); Michigan, MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.788 (1) (Callaghan 1990); Minnesota, MrNN. STAT. AN. § 609.341 (8) (West
1987); Nebraska, NEa. REV. STAT. § 28.318 (4) (1989); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:1 (III) (1986); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 14-1(0 (West 1982); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(B), (D) (Michie Supp. 1994).
25. MIC-I. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(i), (j) (Callaghan 1990).
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(B) (Michie Supp. 1994).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(D) (Michie Supp. 1994).
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is not so worded, and so judicial interpretation has formed the basis
for the similarity between the result in this jurisdiction and those pre-
viously cited.
The holding in Baker and in cases based on statutes recognizing
mental anguish injuries appear to be pro-victim. Generations of wo-
men have long felt that the most enduring injury following a rape is
the recurring mental trauma. Long after any physical injuries have
healed, the mental scars linger. Yet, traditionally it has been difficult
for the State to obtain a rape conviction unless there were significant
physical injuries present. Certainly, physical injuries were easier to
see and document for the jury's later evaluation. The Baker holding
indicates that any past reliance on physical injury is not necessary. In
the future the State's case is likely to focus with increasing frequency
on mental or emotional injury and the duration of such injury. This
will be particularly true where there is no serious physical injury in-
flicted at the time of the rape.
One significant question which arises when mental injury is recog-
nized as an aggravating element of a rape is how the courts are to
determine when the harm done is sufficient to support a conviction for
a higher level offense. Defendants in Michigan1- and New Mexico29
have, in fact, mounted constitutional challenges to the statutes in
those states claiming that they should be void for vagueness. In the
New Mexico case, State v. Jimenez,30 the court dealt with the constitu-
tional challenge by holding that the defendant failed to request clari-
fying jury instructions and noting that the statute defines the crime in
terms of a result which the defendant caused through the use of force.
The court generally implied that the statute provided adequate guide-
lines to determine the degree of mental injury necessary to support
conviction for a higher level crime. The opinion in Jimenez specifi-
cally states "Defendant recognizes that determining the degree of the
crime by the amount of the harm done to the victim does not make
the statute unconstitutionally vague. 
'31
In Michigan, the state court of appeals first faced a constitutional
challenge to that state's statute in People v. Gorney.32 There, the
court preserved the statute by interpreting the degree of mental
anguish necessary to elevate the offense to be "extreme" or "serious"
28. See, e.g., People v. Gorney, 297 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), People v. Petrella,
380 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. 1985).
29. See, e.g., State v. Jimenez, 556 P.2d 60 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
30. Id
31. Id. at 65. The court noted that this recognition by the defendant was premised on the
previous decision in State v. Chavez, 484 P.2d 1279 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), which squarely an-
swered that question.
32. 297 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
19951
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mental anguish.33 The Gorney court set forth two factors which could
establish extreme mental anguish: "the need by the victim for psychi-
atric care or some interference with the victim's ability to conduct a
normal life, such as absence from the workplace."'
A series of decisions following Gorney eroded its holding that in
rape cases the mental anguish must be extreme or serious. In People
v. Baker,35 the court noted that the application of the standard of "ex-
treme or serious" mental anguish was contrary to the legislative intent
as evidenced by the legislative history of the statute; the legislature
intended that any personal injury or any mental anguish suffice.3 6 In
People v. Jenkins,37 a Michigan court of appeals panel directly con-
fronted the reasoning used in the Gorney decision. The Jenkins court
stated:
The concern in Gorney was that virtually all sexual assaults involve
some degree of mental anguish on the part of the victim. Since the
element of mental anguish is, in itself, sufficient to raise third-degree
criminal sexual conduct to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (and
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct to second-degree criminal sex-
ual conduct), the Gorney Court reasoned that the legislature must
have intended the term "mental anguish" to involve more than the
mere mental distress attendant to all sexual assaults. Although the
Court acknowledged that its decision was contrary to the legislative
intent expressed in the legislative history of the statute, it felt com-
pelled to impose the requirement of "extreme" or "serious" mental
anguish "in order to preserve the integrity of the criminal sexual con-
duct statute as a whole", and "to avoid finding the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague." [Citations omitted.]
In our opinion, the Gorney panel's substitution of "extreme" mental
anguish for the statutory phrase "mental anguish" is merely a seman-
tic exercise which results in redundancy and unnecessary confusion.
The term "anguish" is defined in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary as "extreme pain" and "excruciating distress". Therefore,
in common usage, the term "mental anguish" means extreme pain or
excruciating distress of the mind. Viewed in this light, the Gorney
panel's requirement of "extreme" mental anguish results in a
redundancy.
While we agree that virtually all persons who become victims of a
sexual assault involving force or coercion experience some degree of
mental trauma, we do not accept the assumption that all such persons
suffer mental anguish. In our opinion, the proper inquiry to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient evidence of the mental anguish ele-
33. Id. at 651.
34. Id.
35. 304 N.W.2d 262 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
36. Id. at 264, n.1.
37. 328 N.W.2d 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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ment is whether the victim suffered any significant degree of mental
distress greater than that normally attendant to criminal sexual as-
saults accomplished by force or coercion.
38
Finally, People v. Petrella,39 the Michigan Supreme Court held, in
agreement with Jenkins, that the Gorney rationale was clearly wrong
and resulted in redundancy. The Michigan Supreme Court further
held that the term "mental anguish" is not unconstitutionally vague, is
not beyond the grasp of the rational trier of fact, and "is not 'so indefi-
nite that it confers unstructured and unlimited discretion on the trier
of fact to determine' which offense has been committed, if any."4
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, the court saw no need to
construe the statute in a manner that required that the victim suffer
some degree of mental anguish greater than that normally attendant
to criminal sexual assaults accomplished by force. Instead, the court
held that the prosecution must produce evidence from which a ra-
tional trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
victim experienced extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or suffering
of the mind. The court stressed that each case must be decided on its
own facts and that no single factor would be necessary to find mental
anguish. The court listed with approval the factors which the court of
appeals had considered:
(1) Testimony that the victim was upset, crying, sobbing, or hysterical
during or after the assault.
(2) The need by the victim for psychiatric or psychological care or
treatment.
(3) Some interference with the victim's ability to conduct a normal
life, such as absence from the workplace.
(4) Fear for the victim's life or safety, or that of those near to her.
(5) Feelings of anger and humiliation by the victim.
(6) Evidence that the victim was prescribed some sort of medication
to treat her anxiety, insomnia, or other symptoms.
(7) Evidence that the emotional or psychological effects of the assault
were long-lasting.
(8) A lingering fear, anxiety, or apprehension about being in vulnera-
ble situations in which the victim may be subject to another
attack.
(9) The fact that the assailant was the victim's natural father.4 '
The enhanced potential for a positive outcome for the State and the
victim here in North Carolina will likely cause prosecutors to inquire
more frequently and in more detail about mental injuries of rape vic-
38. Id. at 405-06.
39. 380 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. 1985).
40. Id. at 27, quoting Woll v. Kelley, 297 N.W.2d 578, 592 (Mich. 1980).
41. People v. Petrella, 380 N.W.2d 11, 33 (Mich. 1985).
1995]
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tims. 42 It seems reasonable that this inquiry will spawn a great many
more psychological referrals of victims to mental health professionals.
Further, more women may come forward to report rape if they be-
lieve that conviction of first degree rape with longer prison terms is a
real possibility based on their mental injuries. Because retribution is
one of the recognized purposes of punishment for criminal offenses, it
is not unusual for states to increase the level of the offense, and
thereby the potential punishment, as greater harm is done to the vic-
tim. Victims support groups, bolstered by the potential for retribu-
tion, will also be likely to encourage more women to come forward
when greater retribution in the form of longer prison sentences may
result. This is especially likely when there is an enhanced likelihood
of conviction when psychological injury is proved.
There are two concerns raised by the potential increase in psycho-
logical referrals. First, there will be an increased cost associated with
this service that must be covered by either the victim or the state. In
terms of the cost of mental health services, the important factor is that
such services be available to all rape victims regardless of socioeco-
nomic status. While there are many existing rape crisis centers and
public mental health clinics, it is impossible to predict whether ade-
quate numbers exist should counseling become strongly advocated or
almost covertly required to obtain a conviction. Those victims who
have private health insurance will be able to draw upon that resource.
Those who are able to afford out of pocket payment will not be com-
promised as to available counseling. It is the lower middle class vic-
tims who are most likely to be unable to qualify for public assistance,
have no health insurance, and have insufficient personal funds to ac-
quire counseling. This group will be unable to obtain the relief or
vindication through conviction unless there is some provision made
for counseling services by the criminal statutes or a national health
insurance plan is adopted.4 3
Secondly, any implication that mental injuries must persist for a
long period of time may be contrary to the victim's best interest in
terms of putting the incident behind her and getting on with her life.
Several cases refer to the victim's injuries extending up to the time of
trial, making it reasonable to believe that courts may look for injuries
persisting at the time of trial. Accusations of malingering on the part
of the victim are likely to be raised by defendants.
42. Further, evidence of the participation in counseling is something which is quite concrete
to a jury and thus becomes an objective measure of a victim's mental injury.
43. If a universal health insurance coverage plan were to be passed by the federal govern-
ment, the financial concerns regarding psychiatric evaluation and counseling might be relegated
to concerns about tax increases. National health insurance plan availability and coverage details,
however, are unknown presently and are beyond the scope of this note.
9
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From the defendants' perspective, the Baker decision raises a new
risk because all rape victims are not the same. On one hand, victims
with access to adequate psychiatric evaluation are more likely to be
able to show "serious personal injury." On the other hand, even if the
victim does not seek counseling, those victims who are particularly
susceptible to mental injuries may demonstrate sufficient injury to
permit the state to carry its burden of proof regarding serious personal
injury.
The defendant faces a situation not unlike the defendant in a civil
tort claim brought by a plaintiff whose particular sensitivities caused
the harm done by the defendant to be more serious than it would have
been to another plaintiff. This principle, known as the thin skull or
"eggshell skull"" victim rule in tort law, appears to be injected into
rape law by the holding in this case. Under the eggshell skull theory
the aggravation of an unknown condition which produces a dispropor-
tionate, unforeseeable harm, does not excuse the negligent defendant
in any way. The tort defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds her
and is held liable for the aggravation of pre-existing conditions which
occur as a result of his acts.45 However harsh this may seem in negli-
gence cases, there is less compelling reason to attempt to argue for
mediation of this liability for unforeseeable harm caused by the inten-
tional acts of the criminal rape defendant. The defendant's assertion
that the injuries caused were unforeseen will not be likely to prevail.
In the wake of Baker, the outcome of prosecutions may initially ap-
pear inconsistent. This is because the decision as to what constitutes
sufficient injury to be "serious personal injury" within the statutory
meaning is to be decided in North Carolina on the particular facts of
each case.' Several cases will have to be decided before a clear indi-
cation of how long "an appreciable time" after the crime will need to
be. A number of cases will need to be decided based on the element
of serious mental personal injury before prosecutors and defense at-
torneys can predict what will ultimately be sufficient mental injuries to
obtain a first degree rape conviction. Guidelines for decisions may
have to be drawn from case law in other jurisdictions such as the
Michigan case of People v. Petrella.Y7 Conversely, the legislature could
attempt to codify requirements for intensity or duration of mental in-
jury should inconsistency in results prove problematic.
Additionally, the Baker decision will increase in the number of first
degree rape convictions, raising issues of backlog in the courts, poten-
44. This phrase originated in Dulieu v. White, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901).
45. See McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616 (N.Y. 1911).
46. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585; see also supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
47. 380 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
1995]
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tial violations of the defendants' right to a speedy trial, and worsening
of prison overcrowding. However, given the current public concern
over crime, and for reasons including both deterrence and retribution,
these potential problems will likely be considered an acceptable price
to pay for the increased punishment of the perpetrators of a violent
crime.
CONCLUSION
The decision in the State v. Baker case opens the door to the possi-
bility for an increasing number of first degree rape convictions. This
increase may occur because of the potential ease with which prosecu-
tors may plead and prove serious personal injuries if such injuries con-
tinue for an appreciable period of time following the rape. Given that
mental health providers have long recognized significant mental
trauma from forcible rape, prosecutors are likely to increase referrals
to counselors in the hope of an increased probability for conviction of
first degree rape. This referral pattern will increase costs for victims
of rape and/or society in general. Defendants in rape cases run a
greater risk of convictions in some cases than others where the de-
fendant "selects" a victim who is particularly susceptible to mental or
emotional harm.
North Carolina has no statutory definition of mental anguish, unlike
the other seven jurisdictions which consider the victim's mental state
to be an aggravating factor. Due to the lack of statutory definition, it
will take several more trials and appellate decisions to define the ele-
ment of serious personal injury of a mental nature before attorneys
will have adequate guidance as to what types of mental harm, and
their duration, are likely to be sufficient to support a conviction for
first degree rape when other elements which raise the crime to a
higher degree are not present. This decision appears to be a boon for
victims and a sobering potential enhancement of criminal liability of
rape defendants. The emerging case law provides significant retribu-
tion for victims with some promise of protection to society by reduc-
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